The United Nations' Paris Agreement includes the aim of pursuing efforts to limit global warming to only 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels. However, it is not clear what the resulting climate would look like across the globe and over time. Here we show that trajectories towards a '1.5 °C warmer world' may result in vastly different outcomes at regional scales, owing to variations in the pace and location of climate change and their interactions with society's mitigation, adaptation and vulnerabilities to climate change. Pursuing policies that are considered to be consistent with the 1.5 °C aim will not completely remove the risk of global temperatures being much higher or of some regional extremes reaching dangerous levels for ecosystems and societies over the coming decades. s ince 2010, international climate policy under the United Nations moved the public discourse from a focus on atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases to a focus on distinct global temperature targets above the pre-industrial period 1, 2 . In 2015, this led to the inclusion of a long-term temperature goal in the Paris Agreement 1 that makes reference to two levels of global mean temperature increase: 1.5 °C and 2 °C. The former is set as an ideal aim ("pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C") and the latter is set as an upper bound ("well below 2 °C") 1 . This change in emphasis allows a better link between mitigation targets and the required level of adaptation ambition 3, 4 . Assessing the effects of the reduction of anthropogenic forcing through a single qualifier-namely, global mean temperature change compared with the pre-industrial climate-however, also entails risks. This deceptively simple characterization may lead to an oversimplified perception of human-induced climate change and of the potential pathways to limit the impacts of greenhouse gas forcing. We highlight here the multiple ways in which a 1.5 °C global warming may be realized. These alternative '1.5 °C warmer worlds' are related to (a) the temporal and regional dimension of 1.5 °C pathways, (b) model-based spread in regional climate responses, (c) climate noise and (d) a range of possible options for mitigation and adaptation. We also highlight potential high-risk temperature outcomes of mitigation pathways currently considered to be consistent with 1.5 °C owing to uncertainties in relating greenhouse gas emissions to subsequent global warming, and to uncertainties in relating global warming to associated regional climate changes.
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Definition of a '1.5 °C warming'
Global mean temperature is a construct: it is the globally averaged temperature of Earth that can be derived from point-scale ground observations or computed in climate models. Global mean temperature is defined over a given time frame (for example, averaged over a month, a year or multiple decades). As a result of climate variability, which is due to internal variations of the climate system and temporary naturally induced forcings (for example, from volcanic eruptions), a climate-based global mean temperature typically needs to be defined over several decades (at least 30 years according to the World Meteorological Organization) 5 . Hence, to determine a 1.5 °C global temperature warming, one needs to agree on a reference period (assumed here to be 1850-1900 inclusive, unless otherwise indicated), and on a time frame over which a 1.5 °C mean global warming is observed (assumed here to be of the order of one to several decades). Comparisons of global mean temperatures from models and observations are also not straightforward: not all points over Earth's surface are continuously observed, leading to methodological choices about how to deal with data gaps 6 and with the mixture of air temperature over land and surface water temperatures of oceans 7 when comparing full-field climate models with observational products.
Temporal and spatial dimensions
There are two important temporal dimensions of 1.5 °C warmer worlds: (a) the time period over which the 1.5 °C warmer climate is assessed; and (b) the pathway followed before reaching this temperature level, in particular whether global mean temperature returns to the 1.5 °C level after previously exceeding it for some time (also referred to as 'overshooting'; see Fig. 1a ). As highlighted hereafter, for some components of the coupled human-Earth system, there are substantial differences in risk between 1.5 °C of warming in the year 2040, 1.5 °C of warming in 2100 either with or without earlier overshooting, and 1.5 °C warming after several millennia at this warming level.
The time period over which 1.5 °C warming is reached is relevant because some slow-varying elements of the climate system respond with a delay to radiative forcing and to the associated temperature anomalies. Hence the status of such slow-varying elements will change over time, even if the warming is stabilized at 1.5 °C over several decades, centuries or millennia. This is the case with the melting of glaciers, ice caps and ice sheets and their contribution to future sea level rise, as well as the warming and expansion of the oceans, so that a substantial component of contemporary sea-level rise is a response to past warming. In PersPective reseArcH addition, the rate of warming is also an important element of imposed stress for resulting risks, because it may affect adaptation or lack thereof [8] [9] [10] . For example, the faster the rate of change the fewer taxa (and hence ecosystems) can disperse naturally to track their climate envelope across Earth's surface 8, 11 . Similarly, in human systems, faster rates of change in climate variables such as sea level rise present increasing challenges to adaptation to the point where attempts may be increasingly overwhelmed.
Whether mean global temperature temporarily overshoots the 1.5 °C limit is another important consideration. All currently available mitigation pathways projecting less than 1.5 °C global warming by 2100 include some probability of overshooting this temperature, with some time period during the twenty-first century in which warming higher than 1.5 °C is projected with a probability [12] [13] [14] [15] of greater than 50%. This is inherent to the difficulty of limiting warming to 1.5 °C given that Earth at present is already very close to this warming level (about 1 °C warming for the current time frame relative to 1851-1900 16 ). The implications of overshooting are essential for projecting future risks and for considering potentially long-lasting and irreversible impacts in the time frame of the current century and beyond, for instance associated with ice melting 17 and resulting sea level rise, loss of ecosystem functionality and increased risks of species extinction 11 , or loss of livelihoods, identity and sense of place and belonging 18 . Overshooting might cause some impact thresholds to be temporarily exceeded. This might be sufficient to cause permanent loss of ecosystems, or those systems and species able to adapt rapidly enough to cope with a particular rate of change would be faced with the challenge of adapting again to a lower level of warming post-overshoot. The chronology of emission pathways and their implied warming is also important for the more slowly evolving parts of the Earth system, such as those associated with sea level rise (see above). The remaining carbon budget available for emissions is very small, implying that deeper global mitigation efforts are required immediately if the duration and magnitude of the overshoot (exceeding the 1.5 °C level of warming) is to be minimized; see below and Table 1 and Box 1.
The spatial dimension of 1.5 °C warmer worlds is also important. Two worlds with similar global mean temperature anomalies may have very different risks depending on how the associated regional temperature anomalies are distributed (Fig. 1b) . Differential geographical responses in temperature are induced by: (a) spatially varying radiative forcing (for example, associated with land use [19] [20] [21] or aerosols 22 ; (b) differential regional feedbacks to the applied radiative forcing (for example, associated with soil moisture, snow, or ice feedbacks 4, 23 ); and (c) regional climate noise 24 (for example, associated with modes of variability or atmospheric weather variability). Similar considerations apply to regional changes in precipitation means and extremes, which are not globally homogeneous 3, 4 . These regional temperature and precipitation anomalies and their rates of change determine the regional risks to human and natural systems and the challenges to adaptation which they face.
We note that mitigation, adaptation and development pathways may result in spatially varying radiative forcing. Although the greenhouse gases are well mixed, changes in land use or air pollution may strongly affect regional climate. Land-use changes can be associated, for example, with the implementation of increased bioenergy plantations 25 , afforestation, reforestation, or deforestation, and their resulting impacts on local albedo or evapotranspiration. Levels of aerosol concentrations may vary as a result of decreased air pollution 22 . Considering these regional forcings is essential when evaluating regional impacts, although there is still little available literature for 1.5 °C warmer worlds, or low-emissions scenarios in general 22, [26] [27] [28] . The spatial dimension of regional climates associated with a global warming of 1.5 °C is also crucial when assessing risks associated with proposed climate engineering schemes based on solar radiation management (SRM, see below). Besides the geographical distribution of changes in climate, non-temperature-related changes are important, particularly where atmospheric CO 2 has additional and serious impacts through phenomena such as ocean acidification.
Uncertainties of emissions pathways
Emissions pathways that are currently considered to be compatible with limiting global warming to 1. We here illustrate the example of temperature stabilization at 1.5 °C in the long term, but temperatures could also decline further below 1.5 °C. b, Not all conceivable 1.5 °C warmer climates are equivalent. These conceptual schematics illustrate the importance of the spatial dimension of distributed impacts associated with a given global warming, in the example of a simplified world with two surfaces of equal area (the given temperature anomalies are chosen for illustrative purposes and do not refer to specific 1.5 °C scenarios). Left, a reference world (without warming); top right, a world with 1.5 °C mean global warming that is equally distributed on the two surfaces; bottom right, a world with 1.5 °C mean global warming with high differences in regional responses.
PersPective reseArcH probability of limiting warming to below 1.5 °C by 2100 given current knowledge of how the climate system is likely to respond. Typically, this probability is set at 50% or 66% (the chance of limiting warming in 2100 to 1.5 °C or lower). The adequacy of these levels of probability is more a political than a scientific question. This implies that even when diligently following such 1.5 °C pathways from today onwards, there is considerable probability that the 1.5 °C limit will be exceeded. This also includes some possibilities of warming being substantially higher than 1.5 °C (see discussion below of the 10% worst-case scenarios). These risks of alternative climate outcomes are not negligible and need to be factored into the decision-making process. Table 1 provides an overview of the outcomes of emissions pathways that are currently considered 1.5 °C-and 2 °C-compatible with a specific probability 15 (and broadly consistent with the literature assessed in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Fifth Assessment Report (IPCC AR5) 12, 14 , see Box 1 and Supplementary Information). Both 'probable' (66th percentile of scenarios, which remains below the respective temperature targets, that is, with two-thirds of the scenarios having lower or equal global warming) and 'worst-case' (90th percentile, that is, with 10% of scenarios having higher or equal global warming) outcomes of these pathways are presented, including the resulting global temperatures and regional climate changes (see below and Box 1 for details, and the Supplementary Information for median outcomes). The reported net cumulative CO 2 emissions characteristics for these scenario categories include the effects of carbon dioxide removal options (also termed "negative emissions" 29 ), which explains the decrease in cumulative CO 2 budgets after peak warming. Possible proposed carbon dioxide removal approaches include bioenergy use with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) or afforestation and changes in agricultural practice increasing carbon sequestration on land 29 . We note that the use of these approaches is controversial and could entail separate risks, for instance those related to competition for land use 30, 31 . Their implementation is at present also still very limited, and the feasibility of their deployment as simulated in low-emissions scenarios has been questioned 32 . Current publications 12, 14, 15 indicate that scenarios in line with limiting year-2100 warming to below 1.5 °C require strong and immediate mitigation measures and would require some degree of carbon dioxide removal. Alternative scenario configurations can be considered to limit the amount of carbon dioxide removal 32, 33 . The current scenarios 15 as well as recent publications [34] [35] [36] provide updated Rmax,5-day is the annual maximum consecutive 5-day precipitation. g As for footnote e, but for the regional responses associated with the median global temperature outcomes of the considered mitigation scenarios in 2100 (see Box 1 and Supplementary Information for details).
PersPective reseArcH cumulative CO 2 budget estimates, which have larger remaining budgets than earlier estimates 12, 14 . These, however, do not fundamentally change the need for strong near-term mitigation measures and technologies capable of enabling net-zero global CO 2 emissions near to mid-century if the considered emissions pathways are to be followed.
Global and regional climate responses
Considering a subset of regions and extremes shown to retain particularly strong changes under a global warming of 1.5 °C or 2 °C 4, 37 , Table 1 provides corresponding regional responses for the evaluated 1.5 °C-and 2 °C-compatible emissions pathways. Figures 2 and 3 display associated regional changes for a subset of considered extremes: temperature extremes (coldest nights in the Arctic, warmest days in the contiguous USA) and heavy precipitation (consecutive 5-day maximum precipitation in Southern Asia). Changes in hot extremes in central Brazil and in drought occurrence in the Mediterranean region are also provided in Table 1 . We note that the spread displayed for single-scenario subsets in Figs. 2 and 3 corresponds to the spread of the global climate simulations of the 5th phase of the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project (CMIP5), underlying the derivation of the regional extremes for given global temperature levels 4, 37 (see Box 1 for details).
In terms of the resulting global mean temperature increase, Fig. 2 shows that the difference between the 10% 'worst-case' and the 66% 'probable' outcomes of the scenarios is substantial, both for the 1.5 °C and 2 °C scenarios. Interestingly, the worst outcomes of the 1.5 °C scenarios are similar to the probable outcomes of the 2 °C scenarios. Indeed, both of these types of outcome show less than 2 °C warming by 2100, and approximately 2 °C warming in the overshoot phase, although the warming in the overshoot phase can be slightly higher for the worst-case 1.5 °C scenario than for the probable 2 °C scenarios assessed here. Hence, the scenarios aiming at limiting global warming to 1.5 °C also have a clear relevance for limiting global warming to 2 °C 13 , in that they ensure that the 2 °C threshold is not exceeded at the end of the twenty-first century. This contrasts with pathways designed to keep warming to 2 °C, but that have a 10% high-end ('worst-case') warming of more than 2.4 °C. This result is important when considering 2 °C warming as a 'defence line' that should not be exceeded 2 .
Assessing changes in regional extremes illustrates the importance of considering the geographical distribution of climate change in addition to the global mean warming. Indeed, the average global warming does not convey the level of regional variability in climate responses 4 . By definition, because the global mean temperature is an average in time and space, there will be locations and time periods in which 1.5 °C warming is exceeded even if the global mean temperature rise is restrained to 1.5 °C. This is already the case today, at about 1 °C of global warming compared to the preindustrial period 16 . Similarly, some locations and time frames will display less warming than the global mean.
Extremes at regional scales can warm much more strongly than the global mean. For example, in scenarios compatible with 1.5 °C global warming, minimum night-time temperatures (T night,min ) in the Arctic can increase by more than 7°C at peak warming if the 'probable' (66th percentile) outcome of scenarios materializes, and more than 8 °C if the 'worst-case' (highest 10%, that is, 90th percentile) outcome of the scenarios materializes (Fig. 2) . For the 'worst-case' outcome of scenarios considered to be compatible with warming of 2 °C, the changes in these cold extremes is even larger, and can reach more than 9 °C at peak warming (Fig. 2) . Although the change is more limited for hot extremes (annual maximum mid-day temperature, T day,max ) in the contiguous USA, it is nevertheless substantial. At peak warming, these hot extremes can increase by more than 4 °C for the probable 1.5 °C scenarios (the maximum in 66% of the cases), reaching 5 °C warming for the 'worst-case' 1.5 °C scenarios and slightly less for the highest 'probable' 2 °C scenarios. If the 10% 'worst-case' temperature outcome materializes after following a pathway that is considered compatible with 2 °C warming today, the temperature increase of the hottest days (T day,max ) could exceed 5 °C at peak global warming in that region (Fig. 2) . These analyses also reveal the level of inter-model range in regional responses, when comparing the full spread of the CMIP5 distributions (Fig. 2) . This interquartile range reaches about 2 °C for T night,min in the Arctic and 1 °C for T day,max in the contiguous USA at peak warming, that is, it is 2-4 times larger than the difference in global warming at 1.5 °C versus 2 °C. The intermodel range is also very large for changes in heavy precipitation in Southern Asia (Fig. 2) , with an approximate doubling of the response at peak warming for the 75th quantile in the most sensitive models compared to the 25th quantile in the least sensitive models. This highlights that uncertainty in regional climate sensitivity to given global warming levels is an important component of uncertainty in impact projections in low-emissions scenarios (like uncertainty in mitigation pathways or the global transient climate response). Indeed, in cases Box 1 emissions budgets and regional projections for 1.5 °c and 2 °c warming
The emissions budget estimates of Table 1 are based on scenarios currently considered compatible with limiting global warming (ΔT glob ) to 1.5 °C and 2 °C, either in 2100 or during the entire twenty-first century 15 . The emissions pathways are determined based on their probability of limiting ΔT glob below 1.5 °C or 2 °C by 2100 using the probabilistic outcomes of a simple climate model (MAGICC 71 ) exploring the range of climate system response as assessed in the IPCC AR5 72 . The 50th (Supplementary Information), 66th and 90th percentile (Table 1) MAGICC global transient climate response values in the scenarios are 1.7 °C, 1.9 °C and 2.4 °C, respectively, which is consistent overall with the range assessed for this parameter (>66% in the 1-2.5 °C range, less than 5% greater than 3 °C) in the IPCC AR5 72 . The current airborne fraction (ratio of accumulated atmospheric CO 2 to CO 2 emissions over the decade 2011-2020) in these scenarios with this MAGICC version has been estimated at 0.55, which is 20% higher than the central estimate for the most recent decade given in refs 73, 74 , but ref. 74 emphasizes that this quantity is uncertain and subject to variability over time. The estimates provided are consistent with corresponding values from scenarios assessed in the IPCC AR5 12,14 (see Supplementary Table 1) , but have slightly larger estimates for the remaining cumulative CO 2 budgets, consistent with other recent publications [34] [35] [36] . Both sets of scenarios imply that for limiting ΔT glob below 1.5 °C by 2100 strong near-term mitigation measures are needed, supported by technologies capable of enabling net-zero global CO 2 emissions near to mid-century. Table 1 and Figs. 2 and 3 also provide estimates of regional responses associated with given ΔT glob levels (at peak warming and in 2100). The values are computed based on decadal averages of 26 CMIP5 global climate model simulations and all four RCP scenarios following the approach from refs 4,37 (see Supplementary Information for more details). Decades corresponding to a 1.5 °C or 2 °C warming are those in which the last year of the decade reaches this temperature, consistent with previous publications 3, 4, 37 . Corresponding regional responses for the median estimates of the scenarios considered are provided in Supplementary Table 2 and Supplementary Figs. 1 and 2 . The respective estimates of spread for recent (0.5 °C) and present-day (1 °C) global warming are provided in Supplementary Fig. 3 . Figure 4 is based on the same subset of the 26 CMIP5 models as was used for Table 1 and Figs. 2 and 3, but uses RCP8.5 simulations only. For each simulation, the ensemble percentiles are calculated for the time step corresponding to the decade at which a 1.5 °C warming occurs for the first time. Statistics are computed over all 26 climate models and all years within the given decade.
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showing a high regional climate sensitivity (either owing to model specificities or internal climate variability), the tail values of the climate model distributions for 'probable' 1.5 °C-scenario outcomes overlap or even exceed likely values for the 'worst-case' 2 °C-scenario outcome (Fig. 2) . This thus shows that even under the most stringent mitigation (1.5 °C) pathways, some risk of dangerous changes in regional extremes (that is, equivalent to or stronger than expected responses at 2 °C global warming) cannot be excluded.
While most climate change risk assessments factor in the inter-model range of regional climate responses, relatively few consider the effects of extreme weather, such as the temperature increase of the hottest days (T day,max ). Recent literature highlights how these extreme events strongly influence levels of risk to human and natural systems, including crop yields 38 and biodiversity 39 , suggesting that the majority of risk assessments based on mean regional climate changes alone are conservative in that they do not incorporate the effects of extreme weather events. In addition, the co-occurrence of extreme events is also highly relevant for accurately assessing changes in risk, although analyses in this area are still lacking 40, 41 . Hence, the regional analyses of changes in extremes for scenarios aiming at limiting warming to 1.5 °C and 2 °C highlight the following main findings:
(1) Some regional responses of temperature extremes will be much larger than the changes in global mean temperature, by a factor of up to three (T night,min in the Arctic).
(2) The regional responses at peak warming for scenarios that are today considered to be compatible with limiting warming to 1.5 °C (that is, having a 66% chance of stabilizing at 1.5 °C by 2100) can still involve an extremely large increase in temperature in some locations and time frames, in the worst case more than 8 °C for extreme cold night-time temperatures or up to 5 °C for daytime hot extremes (Fig. 2) . We note that these numbers are substantially larger than present-day variability (see Supplementary Information).
(3) The 10% highest-response ('worst-case') temperature outcome of pathways currently considered compatible with 1.5 °C warming is comparable with the 66th percentile ('probable') outcomes of scenarios that are considered compatible with limiting warming to below 2 °C, at global and regional scales. This indicates that pursuing a pathway compatible with warming of 1.5 °C can be considered a high-probability 2 °C pathway 13 that strongly increases the probability of avoiding the risks of a 2 °C warmer world.
Realization at single locations and times
The analyses of Figs. 2 and 3 represent the statistical response over longer time frames. Several dominant patterns of response are documented in the literature 4 , for instance that land temperatures tend to warm more than global mean temperature on average, in particular with respect to hot extremes in transitional regions between dry and wet climates and with respect to coldest days at high latitudes (see also Figs. 2 and 3) . Nonetheless, owing to internal climate variability (and in part model-based uncertainty), there may be large local departures from such a typical response at single points in time (any given year within a 10-year time frame), as displayed in Fig. 4 . Many locations show a fairly large probability (25% chance) of temperature anomalies below 1.5 °C, and in some cases even smaller anomalies (mostly for the extreme indices). On the other hand, there is a similar probability (25%, or 75th percentile) that some locations can display temperature increases of more than 3 °C, and in some cases up to 7-9 °C for cold extremes. This illustrates that highly unusual and even unprecedented temperatures may occur even in a 1.5 °C climate. Although some of the patterns reflect what is expected from the median response 4 , the spread of responses is large in most regions.
Aspects insufficiently considered so far
The integrated assessment models used to derive the mitigation scenarios discussed here did not include several feedbacks that are present in the coupled human-Earth system. This includes, for example, biogeophysical impacts of land use 26, 27, 28 , potential competition for land between negative emission technologies and agriculture 29, 31 , water availability constraints on energy infrastructure and bioenergy cropping 30, 31 , regional implications of choices of specific scenarios for tropospheric aerosol concentrations, or behavioural and societal changes in anticipation of or in response to climate impacts 33, 42 . For comprehensive assessments of the regional implications of mitigation and adaptation measures, such aspects of development pathways would need to be factored in. Table 1 (25th  quantile (q25) , median (q50), and 75th quantile (q75)). b, Global mean temperature anomaly at peak warming (q25, q50, q75). c-e, Regional climate anomalies at peak warming compared to the pre-industrial period corresponding to the median global warming of the second row (full range associated with different regional responses within CMIP5 multi-model ensemble displayed as violin plots; the median and interquartile ranges are indicated with horizontal dark grey lines). See Table 1 for more details.
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We note also that non-CO 2 greenhouse gas emissions need to be reduced jointly with CO 2 . The numbers in Table 1 consider budgets for cumulative CO 2 emissions taking into account consistent evolution of non-CO 2 greenhouse gas emissions. To compare the temperature outcome of pathways from many different forcings (such as methane and nitrous oxide), a CO 2 -only emission pathway that has the same radiative forcing can be found, which is termed 'CO 2 -forcing equivalent emissions' 43, 44 . Hence, stronger modulation in non-CO 2 greenhouse gas emissions could be considered in upcoming scenarios.
Furthermore, a continuous adjustment of mitigation responses based on the observed climate response (which can, for example, reduce present uncertainties regarding the global transient climate response) might be necessary to avoid undesired outcomes. Pursuing such 'adaptive' mitigation scenarios 34 would be facilitated by the global stocktake mechanism established in the Paris Agreement. Nonetheless, there are limits to possibilities for the adaptation of mitigation pathways, notably because some investments (for example, in infrastructure) are long-term, and also because the actual departure from a desirable pathway will need to be detected against the backdrop of internal climate variability. This variability can be large on decadal timescales-as illustrated by the recent so-called "hiatus" period 45 -but its effect on the assessment of mean global temperature anomalies can be minimized by using robust estimates of human-induced warming 16 . Hence, although adaptive mitigation pathways could provide some flexibility with which to avoid the highlighted 'worst-case' scenarios (Table 1) , it is not yet clear to what extent they could be implemented in practice.
For a range of indicators, global mean temperature alone is not a sufficient indicator to describe climate impacts. CO 2 -sensitive systems, such as the terrestrial biosphere and agriculture systems, respond not only to the impact of warming but also to increased CO 2 concentrations. Although the potentially positive effects of CO 2 fertilization are not well constrained 46 , it appears that the impacts of anthropogenic emissions on those systems will depend not only on the warming inferred, but also on the CO 2 concentrations at which these warming levels are reached. Similarly, impacts on marine ecosystems depend on warming as well as on changes being driven by ocean acidification 47 . Impacts on ocean and cryosphere will respond to warming with a substantial time lag. Consequently, ice sheet and glacier melting, ocean warming and as a result sea level rise will continue long after temperatures have peaked 48 . For some of these impacts, this may imply that the detectable effects of mitigation pathways may be limited in the shortterm, but may turn out to be major effects in the long-term 49 . Large-scale oceanic systems will also continue to adjust over the coming centuries. One study identified a continued increase of extreme El Niño frequency in a peak-and-decline scenario 50 . The imprints on such time-lagged systems for different 1.5 °C worlds are not well constrained at present.
Assessing SRM
Compared to any mitigation options, climate interventions such as global SRM do not intend to reduce atmospheric CO 2 concentration itself but solely to limit global mean warming. Some studies [51] [52] [53] proposed that SRM may be used as a temporary measure to avoid global mean temperature exceeding 2 °C. However, the use of SRM in the context of limiting temperature overshoot might create a new set of global and regional impacts, and could substantially modify regional precipitation patterns as compared to a world without SRM 54, 55 . It would also have a high potential for cross-boundary conflicts because of positive, negative or undetectable effects on regional climate 56 , natural ecosystems 57 and human settlements. Hence, while the global mean temperature might be close to a 1.5 °C warming under a given global SRM deployment, the regional implications could be very different from those of a 1.5 °C global warming reached with early reductions of CO 2 emissions and stabilization of CO 2 concentrations. In some cases, some novel climate conditions would be created because of the addition of two climate forcings with different geographical footprints. Hence, a similar mean global warming may have very different regional implications (see Fig. 1b for an illustration) and in the case of SRM would be associated with substantial uncertainties in terms of regional impacts. Furthermore, SRM would not counter ocean acidification, which would continue unabated under enhanced CO 2 concentrations. Finally, there is also the issue that the sudden discontinuation of SRM measures would lead to a "termination problem" 52, 58 , that is, a very rapid increase in global temperature and associated climate changes, which would have even greater impacts than a situation without SRM, owing to the rate of change. Together, this implies that the aggregated Table 1 (q25, q50, q75). b, Global mean temperature anomaly in 2100 (q25, q50, q75). c-e, Regional climate anomalies at peak warming compared to the pre-industrial period corresponding to the median global warming of the second row (full range associated with different regional responses within CMIP5 multi-model ensemble displayed as violin plots; the median and interquartile ranges are indicated with horizontal dark grey lines). See Table 1 for more details.
PersPective reseArcH environmental implications of an SRM world with 1.5 °C mean global temperature warming would probably be very different, and probably more detrimental and less predictable, from those of a 1.5 °C warmer world in which the global temperature is limited to 1.5 °C through decarbonization alone. Nonetheless, regional-scale changes in surface albedo may be worthwhile considering in order to reduce regional impacts in cities or agricultural areas 21 , although in-depth assessments on this topic are not yet available, and such modifications would be unlikely to affect global temperature substantially.
Risks in 1.5 °C warmer worlds
1.5°C warmer worlds will still present climate-related risks to natural, managed and human systems, as seen above. The magnitude of the overall risks and their geographical patterns in a 1.5 °C warmer world will, however, not only depend on the uncertainties in the regional climate that results from this level of warming. The magnitude of risk will also strongly depend on the approaches used to limit warming to 1.5 °C and on the wider context of societal development as it is pursued by individual communities and nations, and global society as a whole. Indeed, these can result in substantial differences in the magnitude and pattern of exposures and vulnerabilities 59, 60 . For natural ecosystems and agriculture, low-emissions scenarios can have a high reliance on land-use modifications (either for bioenergy production or afforestation 25, 29, 61 ) that in turn can affect food production and prices through land-use competition effects 29, 31, 62 . The risks to human systems will depend on the ambition and effectiveness of implementing accompanying policies and measures that increase resilience to the risks of climate change and the potential trade-offs of mitigation. For example, large-scale deployment of BECCS could push Earth closer to the planetary boundaries for land-use change and freshwater, biosphere integrity and biogeochemical flows 30 (in addition to pressures associated with development goals 63 ). Also, the timing of when warming can be stabilized to 1.5 °C or 2 °C will influence exposure and vulnerability. For example, in a world pursuing a strong sustainable development trajectory, large increases in resilience by the end of the century would make the world less vulnerable overall 59 . Even under this pathway, rapidly reaching 1.5 °C would mean that some regions and sectors would require additional preparation to manage the hazards created by a changing climate.
Commonalities of all 1.5 °C warmer worlds
Because human-caused warming linked to CO 2 emissions is now nearly irreversible for more than a thousand years 64, 65 , the cumulative amount of CO 2 emissions is the prime determinant of long-lived permanent changes in the global mean temperature rise at Earth's surface. All 1.5 °C stabilization scenarios require net CO 2 emissions to be zero and non-CO 2 forcing to be capped to stable levels at some point 64, 66, 67 . This is also the case for stabilization scenarios at higher levels of warming (for example, at 2 °C); the only differences would be the time at which the net CO 2 budget becomes zero, and the cumulative CO 2 emissions emitted until that time. Hence, a transition to a decarbonization of energy use is necessary in all scenarios.
Article 4 of the Paris Agreement calls for net zero global greenhouse gas emissions to be achieved in the second half of the twenty-first century, which most plausibly requires some extent of negative CO 2 emissions to compensate for remaining non-CO 2 forcing 13 . The timing of when net zero global greenhouse gas emissions are achieved strongly determines the peak warming. All presently published scenarios compatible with 1.5 °C warming include carbon dioxide removal to achieve net-zero CO 2 emissions, to varying degrees. CO 2 
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warming by 2100 is determined by the difference between the total amount of CO 2 generated (which can be reduced by early decarbonization) and the total amount permanently stored out of the atmosphere, for example by geological sequestration. Current evidence indicates that at least some measure of carbon dioxide removal will be required to follow a emissions trajectory compatible with 1.5 °C warming.
Towards a sustainable 1.5 °C warmer world
Emissions pathways limiting global warming to 1.5 °C allow us to avoid risks associated with higher levels of warming, but do not guarantee an absence of climate risks at the regional scale, and are also associated with their own set of risks with respect to the implementation of mitigation technologies, in particular related to land-use changes associated with for example, BECCS or competition for food production [29] [30] [31] 33 . Important aspects to consider when pursuing the goal of limiting warming to or below a global mean temperature level relate to how this goal is achieved and to the nature of emerging regional and subregional risks [68] [69] [70] . Also relevant are considerations of how the policies influence the resilience of human and natural systems, and which broader societal pathways are followed in terms of human development. Many but not all of these can be influenced directly through policy choices [68] [69] [70] . Internal climate variability as well as regional climate sensitivity, which display a substantial range between current climate models, are also important components of how risk will be realized. Explicitly illustrating the full range of possible outcomes of 1.5 °C warmer worlds is important for an adequate consideration of the implications of mitigation options by decision makers.
The time frame within which major mitigation measures need to be initiated varies with the scenario (Table 1) . However, given the current state of knowledge about both the global and regional climate responses and the availability of mitigation measures, if the potential to limit warming to below 1.5 °C or 2 °C is to be maximized, emissions reductions in CO 2 and other greenhouse gases would need to start as soon as possible, leading to a global decline in emissions following 2020 at the latest. At the same time, if potential competition for land and water between negative emission technologies, agriculture and biodiversity conservation is to be avoided, mitigation would need to be carefully designed and regulated to minimize such competition, which could otherwise act to increase food prices and reduce ecosystem services (such as biodiversity, recreational uses and environmental functions). The remaining uncertainties underscore the need for continuous monitoring not just of global mean surface temperature, but also of the deployment and development of mitigation options, the resulting emissions reductions, and in particular of the intensity of global and regional climate responses and their sensitivity to climate forcing. Together with the choices made towards overall societal development, these various elements strongly codetermine the regional and sectoral magnitudes and patterns of risk at 2 °C and 1.5 °C of global warming.
Code availability
The R code used to analyse MAGICC outputs in this paper is available from R.S. (roland.seferian@meteo.fr) on reasonable request. The scripts used for the regional analyses provided in Table 1 
Data availability
The data underlying the analyses of Table 1 and Figs. 2 and 3 are available on request. Emission data are available from the database accompanying ref. 15 , which presents pathways in line with 1.9 W m −2 of radiative forcing in 2100, limiting warming to below 1.5 °C by 2100. Regional changes in climate extremes for different global warming levels derived following the methodology of refs 4, 37 can be obtained from the associated database associated with the ERC DROUGHT-HEAT project (http://www.drought-heat.ethz.ch) and the software developed under ref. 37 .
